China
Chinese leadership: The challenge in 2012
Author: Kerry Brown, Chatham House One side-effect of the Dengist economic reforms which started to penetrate deeply in the 1980s was the transition from a ruling Chinese Communist Party that was focused on class struggle and revolutionary aspiration under Mao, to one in which a new technocratic elite were in control. In the words of Wang Hui, one of contemporary China’s foremost public intellectuals, that meant that the party started fulfilling a more ‘evaluative’ function and became the sort of ‘bureaucratic machine’ that Mao had tried to prevent. While the economy grew and prospered , the party looked at its own internal governance , at how it promoted key officials, how it dealt with its own accountability, and disciplined those in its fold who had become corrupt. In short, it tried to professionalise itself. Central to this task was the need to have a mechanism (mostly peer pressure) by which the top elite controlled themselves. There was no question of some entity, like the legal system or civil society, standing above the party and placing obligations and regulations upon it. But there was a sense that the party needed to tidy up its act, and that another messy leadership transition of the kind that had occurred between Mao and Deng (which had taken almost two years to achieve) was a luxury the party could no longer afford. Party congresses which had occurred sporadically before 1982 started to happen every five years. Time limits were set on those holding high office. By stealth rather than by stated aim, retirement ages were brought in. By 2002, when there was a transition from the third to the fourth generation of leadership (from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao), nervousness that this process would lead to infighting among factions in the party remained evident till some years into Hu’s era. Only in 2007 was Hu seen by commentators and experts of the party to become his own man with the party congress, meaning he could then elevate a number of people close to him, and gently ease out of positions of influence those seen as close to Jiang before. The imminent party congress in late 2012 is arousing all the speculation that the congress of 2002 did. There has been a decade more of the party being able to build its own internal governance, and trying to modernise its own structures. In the last few years it has practised what has been called ‘intra-party democracy’, attempting to make its processes more predictable and a little more transparent. In a strategy of careful management, the likeliest successor to Hu next year, Xi Jinping, looks like he is following exactly the same path to the crucial position of General Secretary of the CCP — elevation to the Standing Committee of the Politburo as Vice Premier (like Hu), and vice chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, in charge of army affairs (like Hu). A range of leaders around him are also being carefully groomed to slip into major leadership positions when the current incumbents on the all-important standing committee of nine see seven of their members retire. So far, so good. While the party has managed its affairs with great care and attention (Hu is known to almost religiously follow due process, and attempts to build broad consensus across all shades of party opinion for what he does), there is still a nagging sense that while this fourth generation leadership may well have got the internal issue of succession well sorted, it has done so by pushing aside the larger, and much more contentious and challenging issues of broader political reform that are now staring it in the face. Since its entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001, China’s economy has rocketed ahead — as much to the surprise of its leaders as those outside. Good economic performance was predicted back in 2001, but not one in which, in less than ten years, China would become the world’s largest exporter, largest importer, largest holder of foreign reserves and second largest economy. Five years ahead of what had been expected, China is in a much more powerful position than it, or others, had believed possible. This has been a double-edged sword. While it has bought massive increases in GDP and prosperity, it has also created a society where there remain sharp divisions between the haves and the have-nots, and where social classes, from entrepreneurs, to the urban middle class , to the farmers — who, after all, still make up over half the population — are increasingly in conflict with each other over issues from property rights, the state of the environment, rights over pensions, and demands to have more of the wealth that the country has created. The increasing repression since June 2009 , where rights lawyers and activists have been victimised and frequently imprisoned, is symptomatic of a leadership that has been bold in its economic thinking but profoundly cautious in its political views. In the new leadership there are no signs, as yet, that anyone has a particularly strong idea about how, for instance, to deepen the rule of law in the country by allowing genuinely independent courts, or giving a proper legal status to civil society groups. In 2011 the fundamental contradiction of contemporary China is that it runs on a largely centralised system inherited from the Soviet Union in the mid 20 th century while its economy is one of the most modern in the world. As it becomes clearer who the fifth generation leaders will be, and how jobs will be allocated among them, scrutiny will be focussed on what clues they give about how they might approach this hugely challenging and sensitive issue of political reform. The 12 th Five Year Program which was passed in Beijing last March at the annual National People’s Congress, the Chinese parliament, gave some recognition to this in talking a little about the need to build social infrastructure and a more stable, equal society. For the next decade, therefore, the issue will not be about the first battle — to build GDP — but about the conflicts that have come after that, to deal with the issues China will face as it progresses towards a middle-income-status country (its stated aim by 2020). These are proving to be far trickier and more demanding than simply pumping out good growth rates, and it is on these, more and more, that the future leadership of China will need to show the same kind of strong vision that their predecessors did about the economy, back in the late 1970s. So far there is little sign that they have the vision, or the capacity, to do this. But like it or not, over the coming decade, this more than anything else will be their key task. Kerry Brown is head of the Asia Program at Chatham house, London, where he leads Europe-China Research. He is author of ‘Ballot Box China’ (Zed books, 2011) and a biography of Hu Jintao which will appear in early 2012. This article appeared in the most recent edition of the ‘East Asia Forum Quarterly’, ‘Governing China’ . Chinese dam diplomacy: Leadership and geopolitics in continental Asia The challenge of China and China’s challenge – Weekly editorial Chinese leadership and Tibet
Author: Kerry Brown, Chatham House
One side-effect of the Dengist economic reforms which started to penetrate deeply in the 1980s was the transition from a ruling Chinese Communist Party that was focused on class struggle and revolutionary aspiration under Mao, to one in which a new technocratic elite were in control.
In the words of Wang Hui, one of contemporary China’s foremost public intellectuals, that meant that the party started fulfilling a more ‘evaluative’ function and became the sort of ‘bureaucratic machine’ that Mao had tried to prevent. While the economy grew and prospered, the party looked at its own internal governance, at how it promoted key officials, how it dealt with its own accountability, and disciplined those in its fold who had become corrupt. In short, it tried to professionalise itself.
Central to this task was the need to have a mechanism (mostly peer pressure) by which the top elite controlled themselves. There was no question of some entity, like the legal system or civil society, standing above the party and placing obligations and regulations upon it. But there was a sense that the party needed to tidy up its act, and that another messy leadership transition of the kind that had occurred between Mao and Deng (which had taken almost two years to achieve) was a luxury the party could no longer afford. Party congresses which had occurred sporadically before 1982 started to happen every five years. Time limits were set on those holding high office. By stealth rather than by stated aim, retirement ages were brought in. By 2002, when there was a transition from the third to the fourth generation of leadership (from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao), nervousness that this process would lead to infighting among factions in the party remained evident till some years into Hu’s era. Only in 2007 was Hu seen by commentators and experts of the party to become his own man with the party congress, meaning he could then elevate a number of people close to him, and gently ease out of positions of influence those seen as close to Jiang before.
The imminent party congress in late 2012 is arousing all the speculation that the congress of 2002 did. There has been a decade more of the party being able to build its own internal governance, and trying to modernise its own structures. In the last few years it has practised what has been called ‘intra-party democracy’, attempting to make its processes more predictable and a little more transparent. In a strategy of careful management, the likeliest successor to Hu next year, Xi Jinping, looks like he is following exactly the same path to the crucial position of General Secretary of the CCP — elevation to the Standing Committee of the Politburo as Vice Premier (like Hu), and vice chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, in charge of army affairs (like Hu). A range of leaders around him are also being carefully groomed to slip into major leadership positions when the current incumbents on the all-important standing committee of nine see seven of their members retire. So far, so good.
While the party has managed its affairs with great care and attention (Hu is known to almost religiously follow due process, and attempts to build broad consensus across all shades of party opinion for what he does), there is still a nagging sense that while this fourth generation leadership may well have got the internal issue of succession well sorted, it has done so by pushing aside the larger, and much more contentious and challenging issues of broader political reform that are now staring it in the face. Since its entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001, China’s economy has rocketed ahead — as much to the surprise of its leaders as those outside. Good economic performance was predicted back in 2001, but not one in which, in less than ten years, China would become the world’s largest exporter, largest importer, largest holder of foreign reserves and second largest economy. Five years ahead of what had been expected, China is in a much more powerful position than it, or others, had believed possible.
This has been a double-edged sword. While it has bought massive increases in GDP and prosperity, it has also created a society where there remain sharp divisions between the haves and the have-nots, and where social classes, from entrepreneurs, to the urban middle class, to the farmers — who, after all, still make up over half the population — are increasingly in conflict with each other over issues from property rights, the state of the environment, rights over pensions, and demands to have more of the wealth that the country has created.
The increasing repression since June 2009, where rights lawyers and activists have been victimised and frequently imprisoned, is symptomatic of a leadership that has been bold in its economic thinking but profoundly cautious in its political views. In the new leadership there are no signs, as yet, that anyone has a particularly strong idea about how, for instance, to deepen the rule of law in the country by allowing genuinely independent courts, or giving a proper legal status to civil society groups. In 2011 the fundamental contradiction of contemporary China is that it runs on a largely centralised system inherited from the Soviet Union in the mid 20th century while its economy is one of the most modern in the world.
As it becomes clearer who the fifth generation leaders will be, and how jobs will be allocated among them, scrutiny will be focussed on what clues they give about how they might approach this hugely challenging and sensitive issue of political reform. The 12th Five Year Program which was passed in Beijing last March at the annual National People’s Congress, the Chinese parliament, gave some recognition to this in talking a little about the need to build social infrastructure and a more stable, equal society. For the next decade, therefore, the issue will not be about the first battle — to build GDP — but about the conflicts that have come after that, to deal with the issues China will face as it progresses towards a middle-income-status country (its stated aim by 2020). These are proving to be far trickier and more demanding than simply pumping out good growth rates, and it is on these, more and more, that the future leadership of China will need to show the same kind of strong vision that their predecessors did about the economy, back in the late 1970s.
So far there is little sign that they have the vision, or the capacity, to do this. But like it or not, over the coming decade, this more than anything else will be their key task.
Kerry Brown is head of the Asia Program at Chatham house, London, where he leads Europe-China Research. He is author of ‘Ballot Box China’ (Zed books, 2011) and a biography of Hu Jintao which will appear in early 2012.
This article appeared in the most recent edition of the ‘East Asia Forum Quarterly’, ‘Governing China’.
- Chinese dam diplomacy: Leadership and geopolitics in continental Asia
- The challenge of China and China’s challenge – Weekly editorial
- Chinese leadership and Tibet
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Chinese leadership: The challenge in 2012
Business
BRICS: China Classifies Crypto as Property and Prohibits Business Ownership
China’s Shanghai court ruled cryptocurrencies are property, boosting optimism in the crypto industry while maintaining a ban on business transactions. This may signal a shift in future regulations.
China’s Ruling on Cryptocurrency
In a pivotal decision for the nation and its BRICS alliance, China has officially classified cryptocurrency as property while maintaining prohibitions against business transactions involving digital assets. A notable ruling from the Shanghai Songjiant People’s Court affirmed cryptocurrencies as property, sparking optimism within the crypto industry regarding future regulations.
Implications for the Crypto Industry
As cryptocurrencies gain significance globally, the Chinese ruling is viewed as a potential-positive shift amidst ongoing restrictions. While individuals can hold virtual currency, businesses remain barred from engaging in investment transactions or issuing tokens independently. This decision has generated anticipation for more accommodating regulations in the future.
Future Prospects for Cryptocurrency in China
Experts like Max Keiser believe this ruling indicates China’s growing acknowledgment of Bitcoin’s influence. As BRICS nations explore increased cryptocurrency utilization in trade, this legal shift could enhance market demand and lead to greater acceptance of cryptocurrencies as a legitimate asset class, setting the stage for potential developments in 2025.
Source : BRICS: China Rules Crypto as Property, Bars Business Holdings
China
Digital Taxation in China: Effects on Corporate Tax Risk Management and Compliance Strategies
Tax digitalization in China enhances efficiency and accuracy in tax administration through AI and technology. Significant advancements include online services, e-invoicing, and data integration, improving risk management. The government targets further reforms by 2025 to establish a robust intelligent taxation system.
Tax digitalization, also known as “digitalized tax administration” or “tax administration by data,” is gaining momentum in China. Enabled by digital technologies and artificial intelligence, Chinese tax authorities have significantly improved the efficiency and accuracy of tax administration. As a result, tax risks are now easier to identify, and tax audits have become more focused and targeted.
The Chinese tax bureau has made significant efforts to advance tax administration through digital upgrades and intelligent transformation. By utilizing modern information technology, the tax authorities have established platforms such as the electronic tax bureau, which enables online processing of tax registration, filing, and payments. Additionally, the promotion of electronic invoicing and the Golden Tax IV system has improved the efficiency and accuracy of tax administration.
This digital landscape allows tax authorities to integrate data from various sources, including invoices, banking information, business records, and customs data. Such integration facilitates more accurate identification of potential tax risks.
This article explores the impact of tax digitalization on businesses in China, emphasizing the evolving dynamics of tax risk management, particularly regarding data supervision.
At the opening ceremony of the 5th Belt and Road Initiative Tax Administration Cooperation Forum on September 24, 2024, Hu Jinglin, Commissioner of the State Taxation Administration (STA) of China, delivered a speech outlining the efforts of Chinese tax authorities to enhance tax administration and efficiency. He emphasized the importance of advancing tax governance through data, highlighting the STA’s commitment to leveraging data and algorithms for intelligent tax management.
Currently, a pilot program for fully digitalized electronic invoices (e-fapiao) has been expanded nationwide, alongside the launch of a unified electronic tax bureau. Additionally, a smart office platform for tax personnel is under development. These systems aim to provide intelligent services for taxpayers and enable tax officers to deliver differentiated and precise services based on dynamic credit risk assessments.
Furthermore, according to a document released by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and General Office of the State Council in 2021, titled “Opinions on Further Deepening the Reform of Tax Collection and Administration,” China aims to achieve significant progress by 2025 in reforming its tax administration system. In particular, it aims to establish a robust and intelligent taxation framework and develop a first-class intelligent administrative application system, thereby improving tax law enforcement, service, and regulatory capabilities.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Farms to fame: How China’s rural influencers are redefining country life
In Yunnan, influencer Dianxi Xiaoge redefines rural China’s image, showcasing pastoral life, bridging cultural gaps between urbanites and rural communities, and sparking interest through nostalgic content and government support.
In the quiet backwaters of Yunnan, Dong Meihua – though her followers know her by the public alias Dianxi Xiaoge – has done something remarkable: She’s taken the pastoral simplicity of rural China and made it irresistible to millions. In her hands, a village kitchen becomes a stage, and the rhythms of farm life become a story as compelling as any novel. She is one of many rural influencers returning to their roots.
In a digital revolution turning established narratives on their head, China’s countryside is emerging as an unlikely epicenter of viral content. Xiaoge is one of thousands of influencers redefining through social media how the countryside is perceived.
Upending preconceptions of rural China as a hinterland of poverty and stagnation, this new breed of social media mavens is serving up a feast of bucolic bliss to millions of urbanites. It is a narrative shift encouraged by authorities; the Chinese government has given its blessing to influencers promoting picturesque rural images. Doing so helps downplay urban-rural chasms and stoke national pride. It also fits nicely with Beijing’s rural revitalization strategy.
Hardship to revival
To fully appreciate any phenomenon, it’s necessary to first consider the historical context. For decades, China’s countryside was synonymous with hardship and backwardness. The Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s and early 1960s – Communist China’s revered founder Mao Zedong’s disastrous attempt to industrialize a largely agrarian country – devastated rural communities and led to widespread famine that saw tens of millions die.
The subsequent Cultural Revolution, in which Mao strengthened his grip on power through a broad purge of the nation’s intelligentsia, further disrupted customary rural life as educated youth were sent to the countryside for “reeducation.” These traumatic events inflicted deep scars on the rural psyche and economy.
Meanwhile, the “hukou” system, which since the late 1950s has tied social benefits to a person’s birthplace and divided citizens into “agricultural ” and “nonagricultural” residency status, has created a stark divide between urban and rural citizens.
The reform era of Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, beginning in 1978, brought new challenges. As China’s cities boomed, the countryside lagged behind.
Millions of rural Chinese have migrated to cities for better opportunities, abandoning aging populations and hollowed-out communities. In 1980, 19% of China’s population lived in urban areas. By 2023, that figure had risen to 66%.
Government policies have since developed extensively toward rural areas. The abolition of agricultural taxes in 2006 heralded a major milestone, demonstrating a renewed commitment to rural prosperity. Most recently, President Xi Jinping’s “rural revitalization” has put countryside development at the forefront of national policy. The launch of the Internet Plus Agriculture initiative and investment in rural e-commerce platforms such as Taobao Villages allow isolated farming communities to connect to urban markets.
Notwithstanding these efforts, China’s urban-rural income gap remains substantial, with the average annual per capita disposable income of rural households standing at 21,691 yuan (about US$3,100), approximately 40% of the amount for urban households.
Enter the ‘new farmer’
Digital-savvy farmers and countryside dwellers have used nostalgia and authenticity to win over Chinese social media. Stars such as Li Ziqi and Dianxi Xiaoge have racked up huge numbers of followers as they paint rural China as both an idyllic escape and a thriving cultural hub.
The Chinese term for this social media phenomenon is “new farmer.” This encapsulates the rise of rural celebrities who use platforms such as Douyin and Weibo to document and commercialize their way of life. Take Sister Yu: With over 23 million followers, she showcases the rustic charm of northeast China as she pickles vegetables and cooks hearty meals. Or Peng Chuanming: a farmer in Fujian whose videos on crafting traditional teas and restoring his home have captivated millions.
Since 2016, these platforms have turned rural life into digital gold. What began as simple documentation has evolved into a phenomenon commanding enormous audiences, fueled not just by nostalgia but also economic necessity. China’s post-COVID-19 economic downturn, marked by soaring youth unemployment and diminishing urban opportunities, has driven some to seek livelihoods in the countryside.
In China’s megacities, where the air is thick with pollution and opportunity, there’s clearly a hunger for something real – something that doesn’t come shrink-wrapped or with a QR code. And rural influencers serve slices of a life many thought lost to China’s breakneck development.
Compared with their urban counterparts, rural influencers carve out a unique niche in China’s vast social media landscape. Although fashion bloggers, gaming streamers and lifestyle gurus dominate platforms such as Weibo and Douyin, the Chinese TikTok, rural content creators tap into a different cultural romanticism and a yearning for connection to nature. In addition, their content capitalizes on the rising popularity of short video platforms such as Kuaishou and Pinduoduo, augmenting their reach across a wide demographic, from nostalgic retirees to eco-conscious millennials.
But this is not simply digital escapism for the masses. Tourism is booming in once-forgotten villages. Traditional crafts are finding new markets. In 2020 alone, Taobao Villages reported a staggering 1.2 trillion yuan (around $169.36 billion) in sales.
The Chinese government, never one to miss a PR opportunity, has spotted potential. Rural revitalization is now the buzzword among government officials. It’s a win-win: Villagers net economic opportunities, and the state polishes its reputation as a champion of traditional values. Government officials have leveraged platforms such as X to showcase China’s rural revitalization efforts to international audiences.
Authenticity or illusion?
As with all algorithms, there’s a catch to the new farmer movement. The more popular rural influencers become, the more pressure they face to perform “authenticity.” Or put another way: The more real it looks, the less real it might actually be.
It raises another question: Who truly benefits? Are we witnessing rural empowerment or a commodification of rural life for urban consumption? With corporate sponsors and government initiatives piling in, the line between genuine representation and curated fantasy blurs.
Local governments, recognizing the economic potential, have begun offering subsidies to rural content creators, causing skepticism about whether this content is truly grassroots or part of a bigger, state-led campaign to sanitize the countryside’s image.
Yet, for all the conceivable pitfalls, the new farmer trend is an opportunity to challenge the urban-centric narrative that has dominated China’s development story for decades and rethink whether progress always means high-rises and highways, or if there’s value in preserving ways of life that have sustained communities for centuries.
More importantly, it’s narrowing the cultural disconnect that has long separated China’s rural and urban populations. In a country where your hukou can determine your destiny, these viral videos foster understanding in ways that no government program ever could.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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