China
Chinese leadership: The challenge in 2012
Author: Kerry Brown, Chatham House One side-effect of the Dengist economic reforms which started to penetrate deeply in the 1980s was the transition from a ruling Chinese Communist Party that was focused on class struggle and revolutionary aspiration under Mao, to one in which a new technocratic elite were in control. In the words of Wang Hui, one of contemporary China’s foremost public intellectuals, that meant that the party started fulfilling a more ‘evaluative’ function and became the sort of ‘bureaucratic machine’ that Mao had tried to prevent. While the economy grew and prospered , the party looked at its own internal governance , at how it promoted key officials, how it dealt with its own accountability, and disciplined those in its fold who had become corrupt. In short, it tried to professionalise itself. Central to this task was the need to have a mechanism (mostly peer pressure) by which the top elite controlled themselves. There was no question of some entity, like the legal system or civil society, standing above the party and placing obligations and regulations upon it. But there was a sense that the party needed to tidy up its act, and that another messy leadership transition of the kind that had occurred between Mao and Deng (which had taken almost two years to achieve) was a luxury the party could no longer afford. Party congresses which had occurred sporadically before 1982 started to happen every five years. Time limits were set on those holding high office. By stealth rather than by stated aim, retirement ages were brought in. By 2002, when there was a transition from the third to the fourth generation of leadership (from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao), nervousness that this process would lead to infighting among factions in the party remained evident till some years into Hu’s era. Only in 2007 was Hu seen by commentators and experts of the party to become his own man with the party congress, meaning he could then elevate a number of people close to him, and gently ease out of positions of influence those seen as close to Jiang before. The imminent party congress in late 2012 is arousing all the speculation that the congress of 2002 did. There has been a decade more of the party being able to build its own internal governance, and trying to modernise its own structures. In the last few years it has practised what has been called ‘intra-party democracy’, attempting to make its processes more predictable and a little more transparent. In a strategy of careful management, the likeliest successor to Hu next year, Xi Jinping, looks like he is following exactly the same path to the crucial position of General Secretary of the CCP — elevation to the Standing Committee of the Politburo as Vice Premier (like Hu), and vice chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, in charge of army affairs (like Hu). A range of leaders around him are also being carefully groomed to slip into major leadership positions when the current incumbents on the all-important standing committee of nine see seven of their members retire. So far, so good. While the party has managed its affairs with great care and attention (Hu is known to almost religiously follow due process, and attempts to build broad consensus across all shades of party opinion for what he does), there is still a nagging sense that while this fourth generation leadership may well have got the internal issue of succession well sorted, it has done so by pushing aside the larger, and much more contentious and challenging issues of broader political reform that are now staring it in the face. Since its entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001, China’s economy has rocketed ahead — as much to the surprise of its leaders as those outside. Good economic performance was predicted back in 2001, but not one in which, in less than ten years, China would become the world’s largest exporter, largest importer, largest holder of foreign reserves and second largest economy. Five years ahead of what had been expected, China is in a much more powerful position than it, or others, had believed possible. This has been a double-edged sword. While it has bought massive increases in GDP and prosperity, it has also created a society where there remain sharp divisions between the haves and the have-nots, and where social classes, from entrepreneurs, to the urban middle class , to the farmers — who, after all, still make up over half the population — are increasingly in conflict with each other over issues from property rights, the state of the environment, rights over pensions, and demands to have more of the wealth that the country has created. The increasing repression since June 2009 , where rights lawyers and activists have been victimised and frequently imprisoned, is symptomatic of a leadership that has been bold in its economic thinking but profoundly cautious in its political views. In the new leadership there are no signs, as yet, that anyone has a particularly strong idea about how, for instance, to deepen the rule of law in the country by allowing genuinely independent courts, or giving a proper legal status to civil society groups. In 2011 the fundamental contradiction of contemporary China is that it runs on a largely centralised system inherited from the Soviet Union in the mid 20 th century while its economy is one of the most modern in the world. As it becomes clearer who the fifth generation leaders will be, and how jobs will be allocated among them, scrutiny will be focussed on what clues they give about how they might approach this hugely challenging and sensitive issue of political reform. The 12 th Five Year Program which was passed in Beijing last March at the annual National People’s Congress, the Chinese parliament, gave some recognition to this in talking a little about the need to build social infrastructure and a more stable, equal society. For the next decade, therefore, the issue will not be about the first battle — to build GDP — but about the conflicts that have come after that, to deal with the issues China will face as it progresses towards a middle-income-status country (its stated aim by 2020). These are proving to be far trickier and more demanding than simply pumping out good growth rates, and it is on these, more and more, that the future leadership of China will need to show the same kind of strong vision that their predecessors did about the economy, back in the late 1970s. So far there is little sign that they have the vision, or the capacity, to do this. But like it or not, over the coming decade, this more than anything else will be their key task. Kerry Brown is head of the Asia Program at Chatham house, London, where he leads Europe-China Research. He is author of ‘Ballot Box China’ (Zed books, 2011) and a biography of Hu Jintao which will appear in early 2012. This article appeared in the most recent edition of the ‘East Asia Forum Quarterly’, ‘Governing China’ . Chinese dam diplomacy: Leadership and geopolitics in continental Asia The challenge of China and China’s challenge – Weekly editorial Chinese leadership and Tibet
Author: Kerry Brown, Chatham House
One side-effect of the Dengist economic reforms which started to penetrate deeply in the 1980s was the transition from a ruling Chinese Communist Party that was focused on class struggle and revolutionary aspiration under Mao, to one in which a new technocratic elite were in control.
In the words of Wang Hui, one of contemporary China’s foremost public intellectuals, that meant that the party started fulfilling a more ‘evaluative’ function and became the sort of ‘bureaucratic machine’ that Mao had tried to prevent. While the economy grew and prospered, the party looked at its own internal governance, at how it promoted key officials, how it dealt with its own accountability, and disciplined those in its fold who had become corrupt. In short, it tried to professionalise itself.
Central to this task was the need to have a mechanism (mostly peer pressure) by which the top elite controlled themselves. There was no question of some entity, like the legal system or civil society, standing above the party and placing obligations and regulations upon it. But there was a sense that the party needed to tidy up its act, and that another messy leadership transition of the kind that had occurred between Mao and Deng (which had taken almost two years to achieve) was a luxury the party could no longer afford. Party congresses which had occurred sporadically before 1982 started to happen every five years. Time limits were set on those holding high office. By stealth rather than by stated aim, retirement ages were brought in. By 2002, when there was a transition from the third to the fourth generation of leadership (from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao), nervousness that this process would lead to infighting among factions in the party remained evident till some years into Hu’s era. Only in 2007 was Hu seen by commentators and experts of the party to become his own man with the party congress, meaning he could then elevate a number of people close to him, and gently ease out of positions of influence those seen as close to Jiang before.
The imminent party congress in late 2012 is arousing all the speculation that the congress of 2002 did. There has been a decade more of the party being able to build its own internal governance, and trying to modernise its own structures. In the last few years it has practised what has been called ‘intra-party democracy’, attempting to make its processes more predictable and a little more transparent. In a strategy of careful management, the likeliest successor to Hu next year, Xi Jinping, looks like he is following exactly the same path to the crucial position of General Secretary of the CCP — elevation to the Standing Committee of the Politburo as Vice Premier (like Hu), and vice chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, in charge of army affairs (like Hu). A range of leaders around him are also being carefully groomed to slip into major leadership positions when the current incumbents on the all-important standing committee of nine see seven of their members retire. So far, so good.
While the party has managed its affairs with great care and attention (Hu is known to almost religiously follow due process, and attempts to build broad consensus across all shades of party opinion for what he does), there is still a nagging sense that while this fourth generation leadership may well have got the internal issue of succession well sorted, it has done so by pushing aside the larger, and much more contentious and challenging issues of broader political reform that are now staring it in the face. Since its entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001, China’s economy has rocketed ahead — as much to the surprise of its leaders as those outside. Good economic performance was predicted back in 2001, but not one in which, in less than ten years, China would become the world’s largest exporter, largest importer, largest holder of foreign reserves and second largest economy. Five years ahead of what had been expected, China is in a much more powerful position than it, or others, had believed possible.
This has been a double-edged sword. While it has bought massive increases in GDP and prosperity, it has also created a society where there remain sharp divisions between the haves and the have-nots, and where social classes, from entrepreneurs, to the urban middle class, to the farmers — who, after all, still make up over half the population — are increasingly in conflict with each other over issues from property rights, the state of the environment, rights over pensions, and demands to have more of the wealth that the country has created.
The increasing repression since June 2009, where rights lawyers and activists have been victimised and frequently imprisoned, is symptomatic of a leadership that has been bold in its economic thinking but profoundly cautious in its political views. In the new leadership there are no signs, as yet, that anyone has a particularly strong idea about how, for instance, to deepen the rule of law in the country by allowing genuinely independent courts, or giving a proper legal status to civil society groups. In 2011 the fundamental contradiction of contemporary China is that it runs on a largely centralised system inherited from the Soviet Union in the mid 20th century while its economy is one of the most modern in the world.
As it becomes clearer who the fifth generation leaders will be, and how jobs will be allocated among them, scrutiny will be focussed on what clues they give about how they might approach this hugely challenging and sensitive issue of political reform. The 12th Five Year Program which was passed in Beijing last March at the annual National People’s Congress, the Chinese parliament, gave some recognition to this in talking a little about the need to build social infrastructure and a more stable, equal society. For the next decade, therefore, the issue will not be about the first battle — to build GDP — but about the conflicts that have come after that, to deal with the issues China will face as it progresses towards a middle-income-status country (its stated aim by 2020). These are proving to be far trickier and more demanding than simply pumping out good growth rates, and it is on these, more and more, that the future leadership of China will need to show the same kind of strong vision that their predecessors did about the economy, back in the late 1970s.
So far there is little sign that they have the vision, or the capacity, to do this. But like it or not, over the coming decade, this more than anything else will be their key task.
Kerry Brown is head of the Asia Program at Chatham house, London, where he leads Europe-China Research. He is author of ‘Ballot Box China’ (Zed books, 2011) and a biography of Hu Jintao which will appear in early 2012.
This article appeared in the most recent edition of the ‘East Asia Forum Quarterly’, ‘Governing China’.
- Chinese dam diplomacy: Leadership and geopolitics in continental Asia
- The challenge of China and China’s challenge – Weekly editorial
- Chinese leadership and Tibet
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Chinese leadership: The challenge in 2012
Business
Democrat Claims Musk is Undermining Spending Bill Due to China Restrictions – The Hill
A Democrat claims Elon Musk influenced the reduction of a spending bill due to its restrictions on China, suggesting his actions impacted the legislation’s progress and funding allocation.
Allegations Against Musk
A prominent Democrat has accused Elon Musk of deliberately sabotaging a significant spending bill in response to China-related restrictions. This accusation comes amid ongoing tensions between the U.S. and China, particularly regarding technology and trade policies. The claims suggest that Musk’s influence is affecting critical legislative processes, raising concerns among lawmakers about foreign influence in American politics.
Implications for Legislation
The potential ramifications of Musk’s alleged actions could be significant. As a major player in the tech industry, his decisions can sway public opinion and impact the economy. Lawmakers fear that if influential figures like Musk oppose necessary legislation, it might hinder efforts to address vital issues such as national security and economic stability.
Political Reactions
The controversy has sparked debates among both Democrats and Republicans, highlighting the intersection of technology and politics. Many are demanding greater transparency and accountability from tech giants. As the situation unfolds, lawmakers may need to reassess their strategies to ensure that essential legislation moves forward uninterrupted.
Source : Democrat accuses Musk of tanking spending bill over China restrictions – The Hill
China
Dissolving a Company in China: A Comparison of General Deregistration and Simplified Deregistration
China promotes simplified deregistration to enhance its business environment, offering a faster process requiring fewer documents than general deregistration. Companies must meet eligibility criteria, resolve issues, and can choose procedures based on their situation, ensuring compliance for both options.
In addition to the general deregistration procedures, China has been promoting simplified deregistration as one of the key measures to enhance its business environment. This article highlights the differences between the general and simplified procedures, explains the eligibility criteria, and clarifies common misunderstandings about these processes.
Foreign investors may decide to close their business for multiple reasons. To legally wind up a business, investors must complete a series of procedures involving multiple government agencies, such as market regulatory bureaus, foreign exchange administrations, customs, tax authorities, banking regulators, and others. In this article, we outline the company deregistration process overseen by the local Administration for Market Regulation (AMR), comparing the general and simplified procedures.
Before 2016, companies could only deregister through the general procedure. However, on December 26, 2016, the Guidance on Fully Promoting the Reform of Simplified Company Deregistration Procedures was released. Effective March 1, 2017, simplified deregistration procedures were implemented nationwide. Since then, there have been two options: general procedures and simplified procedures.
Companies must follow the general deregistration process if any of the following conditions apply (hereinafter referred to as “existing issues”):
Companies not facing the above issues may choose either the general or simplified deregistration process.
In summary, simplified deregistration is a faster process and requires fewer documents compared to general deregistration. Companies that meet the criteria typically would typically opt for simplified deregistration. Those that do not meet the criteria may choose this route after resolving outstanding issues. For companies with unresolved issues but seeking urgent closure, they can first publish a deregistration announcement. Once the announcement period ends and all issues are addressed, they can proceed with general deregistration. Some companies may question the legitimacy and compliance of simplified deregistration. This is a misconception. “Simplified” does not mean non-compliant, just as “general” does not imply greater legitimacy. Both processes are lawful and compliant. The AMR provides these options to enable companies ready for closure to complete the process efficiently while granting those with unsolved issues the necessary time to address them after publishing the deregistration announcement. Companies can select the most suitable process based on their specific circumstances.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
China’s influence grows at COP29 climate talks as US leadership fades
The 2024 U.N. climate talks in Baku yielded mixed results, agreeing to increase funding for developing nations. However, challenges remained in addressing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving sustainable progress.
The 2024 U.N. climate talks ended in Baku, Azerbaijan, on Nov. 24 after two weeks of arguments, agreements and side deals involving 106 heads of states and over 50,000 business leaders, activists and government representatives of almost every country.
Few say the conference was a resounding success. But neither was it a failure.
The central task of the conference, known as COP29, was to come up with funding to help developing countries become more resilient to the effects of climate change and to transition to more sustainable economic growth.
The biggest challenge was agreeing on who should pay, and the results say a lot about the shifting international dynamics and offer some insight into China’s role. As a political science professor who has worked on clean tech policy involving Asia, I followed the talks with interest.
Slow global progress
Over three decades of global climate talks, the world’s countries have agreed to cut their emissions, phase out fossil fuels, end inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies and stop deforestation, among many other landmark deals.
They have acknowledged since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, when they agreed to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, that greenhouse gas emissions produced by human activities, including the burning of fossil fuels, would harm the climate and ecosystems, and that the governments of the world must work together to solve the crisis.
But progress has been slow.
Greenhouse gas emissions were at record highs in 2024. Governments are still subsidizing fossil fuels, encouraging their use. And the world is failing to keep warming under 1.5 degrees Celsius compared with preindustrial times – a target established under the 2015 Paris Agreement to avoid the worst effects of climate change.
Extreme weather, from lethal heat waves to devastating tropical cyclones and floods, has become more intense as temperatures have risen. And the poorest countries have faced some of the worst damage from climate change, while doing the least cause it.
Money for the poorest countries
Developing countries argue that they need US$1.3 trillion a year in financial support and investment by 2035 from the wealthiest nations – historically the largest greenhouse gas emitters – to adapt to climate change and develop sustainably as they grow.
That matters to countries everywhere because how these fast-growing populations build out energy systems and transportation in the coming decades will affect the future for the entire planet.
Negotiators at the COP29 climate talks. Less developed countries were unhappy with the outcome.
Kiara Worth/UN Climate Change via Flickr
At the Baku conference, member nations agreed to triple their existing pledge of $100 billion a year to at least $300 billion a year by 2035 to help developing countries. But that was far short of what economists have estimated those countries will need to develop clean energy economies.
The money can also come from a variety of sources. Developing countries wanted grants, rather than loans that would increase what for many is already crushing debt. Under the new agreement, countries can count funding that comes from private investments and loans from the World Bank and other development banks, as well as public funds.
Groups have proposed raising some of those funds with additional taxes on international shipping and aviation. A U.N. study projects that if levies were set somewhere between $150 and $300 for each ton of carbon pollution, the fund could generate as much as $127 billion per year. Other proposals have included taxing fossil fuels, cryptocurrencies and plastics, which all contribute to climate change, as well as financial transactions and carbon trading.
China’s expanding role
How much of a leadership role China takes in global climate efforts is an important question going forward, particularly with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump expected to throttle back U.S. support for climate policies and international funding.
China is now the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases and the second-largest economy.
China also stands to gain as provider of the market majority of green technologies, including solar panels, wind turbines, batteries and electric vehicles.
Whether or not China should be expected to contribute funding at a level comparable to the other major emitters was so hotly contested at COP29 that it almost shut down the entire conference.
Previously, only those countries listed by the U.N. as “developed countries” – a list that doesn’t include China – were expected to provide funds. The COP29 agreement expands that by calling on “all actors to work together to enable the scaling up of financing.”
In the end, a compromise was reached. The final agreement “encourages developing countries to make contributions on a voluntary basis,” excluding China from the heavier expectations placed on richer nations.
Side deals offer signs of progress
In a conference fraught with deep division and threatened with collapse, some bright spots of climate progress emerged from the side events.
In one declaration, 25 nations plus the European Union agreed to no new coal power developments. There were also agreements on ocean protection and deforestation. Other declarations marked efforts to reenergize hydrogen energy production and expanded ambitious plans to reduce methane emissions.
Future of UN climate talks
However, after two weeks of bickering and a final resolution that doesn’t go far enough, the U.N. climate talks process itself is in question.
In a letter on Nov. 15, 2024, former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and a group of global climate leaders called for “a fundamental overhaul to the COP” and a “shift from negotiation to implementation.”
After back-to-back climate conferences hosted by oil-producing states, where fossil-fuel companies used the gathering to make deals for more fossil fuels on the side, the letter also calls for strict eligibility requirements for conference hosts “to exclude countries who do not support the phase out/transition away from fossil energy.”
With Trump promising to again withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, it is possible the climate leadership will fall to China, which may bring a new style of climate solutions to the table.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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- China’s influence grows at COP29 climate talks as US leadership fades
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