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The evolution of Sino–American competition in Myanmar

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Author: Adam P. MacDonald, Halifax

For decades, China has been Myanmar’s principal international partner. In the years preceding Myanmar’s opening up, China dominated Myanmar’s foreign discourse as an important economic and military partner, and a source of international diplomatic protection due to the diplomatic isolation and widespread sanctions imposed on Myanmar by the West, especially after the 1988 coup. But it is inaccurate to portray the former military Junta as a completely submissive satellite of Beijing.

US President Barack Obama delivers remarks after a meeting with Myanmar President Thein Sein in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC, USA, 20 May 2013. (Photo: AAP)

In the lead up to the transfer of power in 2010, China supported the reform process on the assumption that its dominant access and influence would remain largely undiminished. Yet the direction and intensity of internal reforms and the movement towards normalisation with Washington has caught Beijing off-guard.

In 2009, the Obama administration began a gradual recalibration of its Myanmar strategy towards opening limited and conditional diplomatic channels. Impressed by the level and commitment to widespread reforms, Washington drove headlong into a rapprochement with Naypyidaw by mid-2011. The United States (along with many Western partners) has not only restored full diplomatic relations but lifted most financial and investment restrictions, with the exception of targeted sanctions against certain persons, and sectors such as mining which are still largely controlled by the military. The importance of this new relationship was underscored by the reciprocal state visits made by President Thein Sein and President Obama in 2012 and 2013.

Washington’s re-engagement with Myanmar coincides with its Asian ‘pivot’ (now named ‘rebalance’) in foreign policy. Despite this, the Obama administration has repeatedly emphasised that its relations with Naypyidaw are grounded in a ‘principal policy’ conditioned on continued governance and human rights reforms and are not directed against China — though there is a convenient congruence between Washington’s promotion of democracy and human rights and its wider geopolitical goals of using Myanmar to extend influence in the region.

Beijing is not convinced. It views the United States’ Myanmar strategy as being directed at ensuring American primacy in the region at its expense. Myanmar is an important state to Beijing for many reasons, including the preservation of ethnic stability along the Chinese border; the large amount of in-country investment, especially in natural resources; the presence of a large Chinese diaspora community; and Myanmar’s strategic position within Southeast Asia adjacent to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.

Still, unlike its vocal criticism of Washington’s perceived interference in other regional matters such as maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas, Beijing has largely stayed silent on Naypyidaw’s new relations with Washington. Instead, it has embarked on its own recalibration strategy to adjust to the changing realities of Myanmar politics.

Beijing has begun to engage multiple actors beyond the military and Thein Sein government. These include the Union of Solidarity and Development Party and the National League of Democracy (NLD). Attempts to forge ties with the NLD have gathered pace with the recent visit of China’s Deputy Foreign Minister to NLD headquarters, in a move which perhaps paves the way for an eventual visit to China by Aung San Suu Kyi. This multi-pronged strategy demonstrates Beijing’s appreciation of the multi-polarity that defines Myanmar politics and its determination to interact with whichever entity is in power.

With Beijing positioning itself to work with any future government, it remains unclear the extent to which Washington will condition normalising relations on the attainment of a minimum level of compliance with democracy and human rights ideals. In light of the faltering constitutional amendment process, and the very real prospect of the military’s continued political involvement, Washington will have to balance its ‘principal policy’ with its wider geopolitical interests. In all likelihood, even if the 2015 elections do not meet Western standards of freedom and fairness, Washington will continue to deepen relations as long as there is no overt return to authoritarian rule.

Washington has begun to tentatively reach out to the Tatmadaw, allowing them observer status in the Southeast Asian military exercise Cobra Gold. Recent US State Department pronouncements have also suggested that, if reforms continue, arms sales to Myanmar are a real possibility. By building trust, contacts and relationships in Myanmar, these efforts will gradually dilute the Tatmadaw’s exclusive relationship with Beijing. This is a delicate process for the Tatmadaw: in many ways, it is still wary of Western intentions, and has maintained close military ties and arms sales with China. And although China accepts growing economic and political competition, any eroding of its strategic and military relations with Myanmar will most likely elicit a stronger reaction.

Beijing acknowledges the growing diversification of Myanmar’s foreign relations, but remains concerned about any moves of alignment towards the West. And at the same time as not wanting to be seen as a client of China, Naypyidaw also recognises the importance of maintaining relations with its giant neighbour and largest trading partner. As the ASEAN Chair, Naypyidaw will have to carefully navigate delicate matters such as competing maritime claims in the South China Sea between ASEAN members and China. This will test its ability to walk a sensitive geopolitical fault line. Washington will no doubt take note of its performance.

Ultimately, Myanmar is not just a bystander but is actively involved in maximising benefits from the growing competition between Beijing and Washington. Myanmar will most likely attempt to balance a neutral policy of non-alignment with both great powers. An important question in coming years is whether the wider geopolitical context will overshadow and lessen scrutiny over Myanmar’s continuation of democratic reform and national reconciliation.

Adam P MacDonald is an independent researcher based in Halifax, Canada.

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The evolution of Sino–American competition in Myanmar

Business

Business Update: Southern Sun Reports Earnings Growth; China Stimulates Property Market – News24

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Southern Sun reports increased earnings, attributed to growth in the hospitality sector, while China’s property market receives a boost, reflecting economic recovery and renewed investor confidence.


Southern Sun Earnings Surge

Southern Sun has reported a significant increase in its earnings, showcasing solid financial performance amid evolving market conditions. This growth highlights the company’s resilience and adaptability to changing consumer demands, positioning it well for future opportunities in the hospitality industry.

China’s Property Market Recovery

In a bid to rejuvenate its economy, China has introduced measures to boost its property market. These initiatives aim to stabilize real estate prices and encourage investment, which is crucial for maintaining economic momentum. The government’s commitment to supporting the sector reflects its understanding of the industry’s importance in overall economic health.

Broader Economic Implications

The rise in Southern Sun’s earnings and China’s proactive approach to revitalizing its property market indicate broader economic trends. Investors and stakeholders are keenly observing these developments, as they may signal recovery and growth opportunities in both the hospitality and real estate sectors. The collaboration between local businesses and governmental actions will be pivotal in shaping future economic landscapes.

Source : Business brief | Southern Sun sees earnings rise; China boosts its property market – News24

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China

Vietnam’s Approach to China: A Balance of Cooperation and Struggle

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Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy seeks a balance of cooperation and struggle with China, focusing on strengthening ties while resisting encroachments in the South China Sea through military enhancements and regional partnerships.


Vietnam’s Diplomatic Strategy

Vietnam’s diplomatic approach seeks to maintain a delicate balance between cooperation and struggle with China. While concerned about China’s growing influence, particularly in the South China Sea, Hanoi focuses on strengthening its economic and political ties. This effort involves military enhancements, fostering relationships with regional powers, and engaging in frequent political dialogues. By skillfully navigating relations with major powers, Vietnam aims to protect its sovereignty and foster stability amidst evolving geopolitical dynamics.

Recent Developments and Implications

Hanoi’s diplomatic maneuvering has drawn attention, particularly regarding key visits like Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary To Lam’s August 2024 trip to China. Although there are apprehensions about a potential shift in Vietnam’s alignment due to To Lam’s background in public security and his anti-corruption initiatives, it is premature to predict any significant changes in policy. Vietnam’s leaders must continuously seek a balance between peaceful coexistence with China and safeguarding national sovereignty.

Economic Interdependence and Military Modernization

Vietnam’s strategy involves fostering economic interdependence with China while simultaneously resisting encroachments. This paradigm of “cooperation and struggle” enables Hanoi to cultivate beneficial ties in economic, political, and security domains. By leveraging its geographical advantage and connections, Vietnam enhances its economic ties while countering threats through military modernization and cooperation with regional partners. This nuanced approach allows Vietnam to welcome trade, particularly amidst shifting dynamics from the US-China trade war, ensuring continued foreign direct investment and growth in key sectors.

Source : Cooperation and struggle define Vietnam’s approach to China

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China

2025 Schedule of Public Holidays in China

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China’s 2025 public holiday schedule increases holidays by two days, with an 8-day Spring Festival and a 5-day Labor Day. Adjustments address public frustration, though long work periods persist. Notably, weekends are often designated as workdays to balance extended breaks.


China has released its 2025 Public Holiday schedule. Compared to 2024, the number of public holidays for all citizens has increased by two days, specifically for Lunar New Year’s Eve and May 2nd.

The announcement also clarifies the adjusted holiday arrangements, stating that the continuous work period before and after statutory holidays generally should not exceed six days, except for certain special circumstances.

According to the notice, in 2025, the Spring Festival will have an 8-day holiday, the Labor Day holiday will last 5 days, and the National Day and Mid-Autumn Festival will jointly have 8 days off.

China has long been considered one of the least generous countries in terms of public holidays. Additionally, people have expressed frustration over the complicated adjustments to holiday and working days that are meant to create longer breaks. The newly introduced changes are expected to address these concerns to some extent.

Beyond the newly introduced changes, China’s 2025 public holiday schedule still features two major week-long holidays: Spring Festival (also known as Chinese New Year) and the National Day holiday (often called ‘Golden Week’).

In 2025, the Spring Festival falls between January 28 and February 4, and the National Day holiday, together with the Mid-Autumn Festival, fall between October 1 and 8.

Foreign human resource managers should note that Saturdays and Sundays are often marked as additional official workdays in China to compensate for long holiday breaks. For example, January 26 (Sunday) and February 8 (Saturday) are designated as workdays to partially offset the eight days off for the Spring Festival.


This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in ChinaHong KongVietnamSingapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support.

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