Connect with us
Wise usd campaign
ADVERTISEMENT

China

With Xi’s new power is collective leadership over?

Published

on

Author: Shen Dingli, Fudan University

There is currently much talk about whether China’s President Xi Jinping is shifting away from collective leadership. Western observers tend to conclude that, given his command of all powers since becoming Chinese communist party chief and state president, Xi is centralising power around himself. But that is a premature conclusion that bears more careful scrutiny.

Chinese president Xi Jinping leads the parade of present and past leaders, as they gather for the National Day reception at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on 30 September 2014. (Photo: AAP).

China’s communist party has always claimed to adopt ‘democratic centralism’. And, at different times, the party has emphasised either the ‘democratic’ or ‘centralist’ aspect. The key has been to strike a balance. On the one hand, an overly democratic system may act with low efficiency. The recent inability of the US Congress to make a compromise on budgetary sequestration is a key example of this. On the other, an overly centralist system tends to push the paramount leader’s own agenda while ignoring the ideas of others. For example, George W. Bush’s pre-emptive war against Iraq in 2003 — without adequate intelligence or consensus in the United Nations Security Council — has, mistakenly and unnecessarily, led both America and Iraq in the wrong direction.

China’s overall system, by design, is more centralised than many in the west, so it has also been burdened by a number of frustrations in the past — such as the launch of the Cultural Revolution. China has adopted a series of political reforms to prevent such problems from arising again. For instance, China now employs a fixed five-year term system — instead of the lifelong system under Mao — to set its political cycles. More emphasis is also put on collective leadership by allowing for effective and more regular policy consultations and deliberations.

The division of jobs within China’s Politburo level seems to be an institutional means to attain collective leadership, but it hasn’t always been successful. Though policymaking behind the wall of the Forbidden City tends to be opaque, it is still possible to feel that members of the Politburo Standing Committee — such as Zhou Yongkang, who took charge of legal and judicial matters between 2007 and2012 — could abuse collective leadership for personal ambition. While Zhou never paralysed the system, his actions have adversely affected the efficacy of collective leadership.

With this in mind, China has to improve its leadership system to make it truly collective, and prevent any individual from monopolising power under the guise of collective leadership. Xi’s return to a more centralised system seems to be part of his efforts to manage effectively these power relations so as to prevent a situation like Zhou’s power trip from re-emerging. Looking from the outside, Xi has so far successfully managed this process.

The current domestic and international circumstances required that Xi move to centralise. In addition to the weak collective leadership of Standing Committees in the past, China’s rapid growth has rendered the present government organisation less effective in responding to the demands of economic and social reform. Meanwhile, the international response to China’s rapid ascendance also warrants cordial — yet decisive — Chinese leadership. During China’s own fast transformation and a period of regional, as well as global, power transition, China needs a determined leader who can command collective leadership domestically.

Obviously, in the course of strengthening the effectiveness of collective leadership the chance of shifting away from its original intent may actually increase. But as long as Xi allows policy consultation and deliberation before decisions are made, his revamped system may actually enhance China’s ‘democratic centralist institution’.

Given his expected ten-year tenure, Xi seems to be poised to make the democratic centralist system a stronger and more efficient institution. At the same time, to avoid the pitfalls of shifting away from collective leadership, he must — after two years of consolidating his power base — be aware of the importance of both leading his team and sharing his power.

Shen Dingli is Professor and Associate Dean at the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University.

Excerpt from:
With Xi’s new power is collective leadership over?

Business

Business Update: Southern Sun Reports Earnings Growth; China Stimulates Property Market – News24

Published

on

Southern Sun reports increased earnings, attributed to growth in the hospitality sector, while China’s property market receives a boost, reflecting economic recovery and renewed investor confidence.


Southern Sun Earnings Surge

Southern Sun has reported a significant increase in its earnings, showcasing solid financial performance amid evolving market conditions. This growth highlights the company’s resilience and adaptability to changing consumer demands, positioning it well for future opportunities in the hospitality industry.

China’s Property Market Recovery

In a bid to rejuvenate its economy, China has introduced measures to boost its property market. These initiatives aim to stabilize real estate prices and encourage investment, which is crucial for maintaining economic momentum. The government’s commitment to supporting the sector reflects its understanding of the industry’s importance in overall economic health.

Broader Economic Implications

The rise in Southern Sun’s earnings and China’s proactive approach to revitalizing its property market indicate broader economic trends. Investors and stakeholders are keenly observing these developments, as they may signal recovery and growth opportunities in both the hospitality and real estate sectors. The collaboration between local businesses and governmental actions will be pivotal in shaping future economic landscapes.

Source : Business brief | Southern Sun sees earnings rise; China boosts its property market – News24

Continue Reading

China

Vietnam’s Approach to China: A Balance of Cooperation and Struggle

Published

on

Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy seeks a balance of cooperation and struggle with China, focusing on strengthening ties while resisting encroachments in the South China Sea through military enhancements and regional partnerships.


Vietnam’s Diplomatic Strategy

Vietnam’s diplomatic approach seeks to maintain a delicate balance between cooperation and struggle with China. While concerned about China’s growing influence, particularly in the South China Sea, Hanoi focuses on strengthening its economic and political ties. This effort involves military enhancements, fostering relationships with regional powers, and engaging in frequent political dialogues. By skillfully navigating relations with major powers, Vietnam aims to protect its sovereignty and foster stability amidst evolving geopolitical dynamics.

Recent Developments and Implications

Hanoi’s diplomatic maneuvering has drawn attention, particularly regarding key visits like Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary To Lam’s August 2024 trip to China. Although there are apprehensions about a potential shift in Vietnam’s alignment due to To Lam’s background in public security and his anti-corruption initiatives, it is premature to predict any significant changes in policy. Vietnam’s leaders must continuously seek a balance between peaceful coexistence with China and safeguarding national sovereignty.

Economic Interdependence and Military Modernization

Vietnam’s strategy involves fostering economic interdependence with China while simultaneously resisting encroachments. This paradigm of “cooperation and struggle” enables Hanoi to cultivate beneficial ties in economic, political, and security domains. By leveraging its geographical advantage and connections, Vietnam enhances its economic ties while countering threats through military modernization and cooperation with regional partners. This nuanced approach allows Vietnam to welcome trade, particularly amidst shifting dynamics from the US-China trade war, ensuring continued foreign direct investment and growth in key sectors.

Source : Cooperation and struggle define Vietnam’s approach to China

Source link

Continue Reading

China

2025 Schedule of Public Holidays in China

Published

on

China’s 2025 public holiday schedule increases holidays by two days, with an 8-day Spring Festival and a 5-day Labor Day. Adjustments address public frustration, though long work periods persist. Notably, weekends are often designated as workdays to balance extended breaks.


China has released its 2025 Public Holiday schedule. Compared to 2024, the number of public holidays for all citizens has increased by two days, specifically for Lunar New Year’s Eve and May 2nd.

The announcement also clarifies the adjusted holiday arrangements, stating that the continuous work period before and after statutory holidays generally should not exceed six days, except for certain special circumstances.

According to the notice, in 2025, the Spring Festival will have an 8-day holiday, the Labor Day holiday will last 5 days, and the National Day and Mid-Autumn Festival will jointly have 8 days off.

China has long been considered one of the least generous countries in terms of public holidays. Additionally, people have expressed frustration over the complicated adjustments to holiday and working days that are meant to create longer breaks. The newly introduced changes are expected to address these concerns to some extent.

Beyond the newly introduced changes, China’s 2025 public holiday schedule still features two major week-long holidays: Spring Festival (also known as Chinese New Year) and the National Day holiday (often called ‘Golden Week’).

In 2025, the Spring Festival falls between January 28 and February 4, and the National Day holiday, together with the Mid-Autumn Festival, fall between October 1 and 8.

Foreign human resource managers should note that Saturdays and Sundays are often marked as additional official workdays in China to compensate for long holiday breaks. For example, January 26 (Sunday) and February 8 (Saturday) are designated as workdays to partially offset the eight days off for the Spring Festival.


This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in ChinaHong KongVietnamSingapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support.

Read the rest of the original article.

Continue Reading