China
A new vision for China–Australia relations
Author: Stuart Harris, ANU
Australia’s foreign policy has been a mix of positives and negatives under the Liberal-National Coalition government, as was true of the previous Labor government. Former prime ministers Gough Whitlam and Bob Hawke recognised the need for Australia to think strategically about future regional developments, and John Howard’s thinking gradually moved in that direction. Such long-term strategic thinking, centred on Australia’s geographic realities and its evolving regional relationships, is more urgently needed today.
Asia’s regional dynamics are changing. While the US is a Pacific power, it’s an outsider in Asia. To complicate the picture, the region features a China that is the largest trading partner of all Asian nations, including Australia. Australia’s future relations with the region, in Northeast Asia and with ASEAN particularly, will depend upon its relations with China as well as with the US.
A coherent strategy must reflect the reality that Australia is linked to Asia from within the region. It needs to reflect the growing importance of China globally and to Australia, and to develop a political depth with that country similar to that with the US. And it will be increasingly difficult to continue separating the economic and strategic issues of this engagement.
As a result, Australia needs a greater understanding of China’s environment, history, and culture, including its political system. Australia need not like that system, but it must be able to work effectively with it.
The dominant and often one-sided Western perspective is not always helpful when judging whether China will be aggressive and expansionist or whether it will live more or less peaceably with the rest of the world. Westerners often assume that terms like ‘international rules’, ‘global order’ and what constitutes ‘responsible behaviour’ are understood and accepted by all others. Yet for China, these terms have emerged from a different culture and historical experience. These differences in vision affect China’s foreign policy.
Yet, despite obvious exceptions, such as human rights, China is well integrated into the international system and largely complies with international rules — probably at least as well as other major powers. China’s reluctance to lead internationally might suggest not just free-riding but a reluctance to challenge the existing global order.
When China opened up, it joined an international order that reflected a pluralistic view of the international community, that acknowledged differences in political and domestic value systems, and that pursued mutually acceptable global rules and geopolitical equilibrium. Then the common vision shifted and the membership bar was raised.
Ultimately, a US-led international system emerged that involved an agenda of good governance, ‘free’ markets and ‘democracy’ (usually just elections). These aimed to advance US security and its other interests. The objective of regime change under this agenda in Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Syria and perhaps Ukraine suggests we should be cautious about what we wish for. For China, in any case, this agenda implies regime change, social instability, and the end of the Party-state.
Of course, China has regional and global ambitions and its relative military and other capacities will grow substantially. China wants a role that commands attention and respect from its neighbours, particularly in its ‘near abroad’, and Australia may not always like what it or others do. The US needs to manage relations between states rather than just pursue political change or impose views of complex issues that then become part of the problem.
China feels internationally vulnerable and, as with the US, domestic nationalism influences its policies. Internally, China’s leaders fear fragmentation, instability and competition for power. There are major problems to deal with at home.
With domestic issues as its main priority, China’s foreign policies will remain largely defensive and reactive to external influences, rather than offensive and expansive. China knows it needs stable relations with the US and its neighbours in order to sustain its development. It will seek changes to the rules by basically working within the existing framework.
Maritime disputes are worrying but hardly central to Australia’s strategic interests. Sovereignty claims by all parties are unhelpful and pose serious risks of miscalculation. Australia’s attention is understandably focused on China, but the historical context needs to be understood, including China’s ‘missing out’ on territory in the 1960s and 1970s regional ‘island grab’. Provocations and efforts to change the status quo are not limited to China or unconnected to the US pivot and the regionally divisive Trans-Pacific Partnership.
A US regional presence remains strategically important, but the US and Australia’s values and vital interests are often different and Australia needs to re-examine its concepts of regional order. There are considerable risks in Australia’s growing enmeshment in the US regional security system to where Australia’s security policy is increasingly a function of that of the US, and an independent Australian position is difficult to maintain.
These issues will become important in the future with any adverse regional developments, notably potentially over Taiwan. US diplomatic management of such problems will remain critical. But history will treat unkindly any Australian political leader who, consciously or inadvertently, commits Australia to military conflict involving China without clear public support and a full parliamentary debate, based on an explicit strategic assessment of Australia’s long term vital interests.
Stuart Harris is Emeritus Professor in the Department of International Relations, at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific. His latest book, China’s foreign policy, is available from Wiley.
This article was originally published at policyforum.net, the website of the Asia and the Pacific Policy Society.
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A new vision for China–Australia relations
Business
China Provides Clarification on the Implementation of Article 88 (1) of the New Company Law
China’s Supreme People’s Court clarified that Article 88(1) of the New Company Law won’t apply retroactively, easing concerns for prior shareholders in equity transfers before July 1, 2024.
Clarification on Article 88(1) Non-Retroactivity
The Supreme People’s Court of China has clarified that Article 88(1) of the New Company Law will not retroactively apply to equity transfer disputes occurring before July 1, 2024. This announcement aims to address concerns from existing shareholders and resolve discrepancies in judicial decisions nationwide. Companies are advised to strengthen risk management practices for future equity transactions.
Judicial Guidance and Legal Framework
On December 24, 2024, the Supreme People’s Court issued a response reaffirming that disputes tied to equity transfers before the July 1, 2024, deadline will be governed by previous laws. This decision follows inconsistencies in judicial rulings regarding capital contributions, prompting a review by the Legislative Affairs Commission, which concluded that retroactive application was not justifiable.
Risk Management Strategies Moving Forward
Despite the ruling, equity transfers after July 1, 2024, may still attract supplemental liability under Article 88(1). To mitigate these risks, businesses should consider reducing registered capital, conducting thorough risk assessments, and implementing contractual safeguards to protect against potential liabilities.
Source : China Clarifies the Application of Article 88 (1) of the New Company Law
China
China Unveils Draft Catalogue to Promote Foreign Investment
The 2024 Draft FI Encouraged Catalogue features a national and regional sub-catalogue, highlighting industries favorable for foreign direct investment in China. It expands incentives in sectors like medical devices, batteries, new energy vehicles, pet care, elderly care, and cultural tourism.
Similar to the previous version, the Draft FI Encouraged Catalogue includes two sub-catalogues – one covers the entire country (“national catalogue”) and one covers the central, western, and northeastern regions (“regional catalogue”).
Together, the FI encouraged catalogue identifies industries where foreign direct investment (FDI) will be welcome and treated with favorable policies in China.
The lengthening of the catalogue demonstrates China’s firm standing on economic opening-up and the fact that more investment fields will favor foreign investors.
Overall, the revision of the 2024 Draft Foreign Investment (FI) Encouraged Catalogue focuses on:
In specific sectors, the new Encouraged Catalogue introduces or refines incentives for areas like medical devices, batteries, new energy vehicles, pet care, elderly care, and cultural tourism, which are worth noting.
| This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
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China
Trump, Xi and Putin: a dysfunctional love triangle with stakes of global significance
Reports suggest a phone call between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin hinted at a complex US-Russia relationship. Trump aims to exploit Russia-China tensions, potentially reshaping alliances and international dynamics.
Reports of a phone call between the US president-elect, Donald Trump, and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin (although quickly denied by the Kremlin) have given a first flavour of the tone and direction of their relationship in the immediate future. According to the Washington Post, Trump spoke with Putin on November 7, warning him against any escalation in Ukraine and reminding him of “Washington’s sizeable military presence in Europe”.
Regardless of whether it happened or not, any – if even only indirect – exchange of messages between the pair should be heeded by America’s allies in the west, as well as Russia’s major partner in the east: China’s Xi Jinping. And there has been plenty of such messaging over the past few months.
Putin, earlier on the day of the alleged phone call, gave a long address at the annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club thinktank in the Black Sea resort of Sochi. Unsurprisingly, the speech – and Putin’s answers to questions from the audience afterwards – were anti-western and full of confidence that a new world order was now in “the phase of genuine creation”.
But at the same time, Putin took pains to flatter Trump as a “courageous man”, saying he’d consider any proposals from Trump aimed at restoring US-Russia relations and ending what Putin called the “Ukrainian crisis”.
But he then spent considerably more time making the case for the relationship between Russia and China. Here his audience was less the incoming US president and more his old friend the Chinese president.
The reason for this goes back to one of Trump’s messages to Putin and Xi. Trump told Tucker Carlson at a campaign event on October 31 that he would work to “un-unite” Russia and China. Trump implied that the two are “natural enemies” because Russia has vast territory that China covets for its population.
Donald Trump: US will ‘un-unite’ Russia and China.
Russia and China have a history of conflict over territory along their long land border in Siberia. This was part of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, which preceded the US opening to China under then-president Richard Nixon in the 1970s.
In contrast to Nixon, Trump looks set to try to reset US relations with Moscow rather than Beijing. While it’s hard to imagine a similar split between Russia and China today, Trump’s apparent desire to exploit discord between Russia and China to the advantage of the US should not be dismissed as completely unrealistic either.
On the face of it, Putin and Xi are closely aligned. But a deeper dive into the relationship between Russia and China suggests it’s primarily one between their current leaders and lacks much of the institutional depth that other alliances have.
Putin and XI: a ‘new era’ of partnership between their two countries.
EPA-EFE/Maxim Shemetov/pool
There is a lot of resentment of China in Russia in both public and policy circles. Russians remain wary of China’s growing role in Central Asia and worry about the potential for disputes over long-contested borders. Many are also resentful of the fact that Moscow is now a junior partner to Beijing.
These are potentially all issues that Trump could use to drive a wedge between Russia and China. But a lot hinges on what Putin perceives is in it for Russia. This should be focusing minds in the west about what shape Trump’s Ukraine policy will take and what this means for Ukraine and the west.
A Trump-brokered agreement is likely to involve the recognition of Russian territorial gains in Ukraine since 2014, complete sanctions relief and broad international rehabilitation granted to Moscow. It would surely also involve a down-scaling of the US commitment to Nato and a pledge not to pursue further enlargement of the alliance.
Trump might get a deal with Putin, but whether Putin would stick to it is questionable. Putin is much more likely to simply play both sides in the hope that Russia might in this way become a third peer alongside China and the US in an emerging new international order.
This is of course a complete fantasy given the size of the Russian economy alone, but unlikely to affect Putin’s calculations, given his longing to restore Russia’s superpower status.
Chinese leverage
An American opening to Moscow, as opposed to Beijing, is also difficult to imagine because America’s European partners are unlikely to go along with it. Some, like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico might find the idea attractive in general, but Germany and France, among others in the EU, are more likely to want to make a deal with China.
The reason for this is economic – they have largely overcome their dependence on Russian oil and gas, but not on China as an export market.
Shared values? Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin at the commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the 1918 armistice.
EPA-EFE/Ludovic Marin
Beijing, meanwhile, won’t sit idly by while Trump tries to drive a wedge between Russia and China. Despite Putin’s efforts to build parallel relations with North Korea and Iran, Xi retains plenty of economic leverage over Russia and is going to use it to keep Russia on side.
Diplomatically, Putin depends on Xi and China-led outfits such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Brics. While there are differences between Moscow and Beijing, they also both share a world view of a US in terminal decline – which is now likely to be further accelerated by the upheaval expected from a second Trump term.
For China in particular, preventing the US from completely pivoting to the Indo-Pacific will be a key priority – and not allowing Trump to cut a deal with Putin at China’s expense will be high on Xi’s agenda as a means to achieving that end.
Trump might still try to open up to Russia by striking a deal with Putin over Ukraine. But such a deal with Putin is not the same as dividing Russia and China. On the contrary, it is more likely to “un-unite” Europe and the US and to further weaken the transatlantic alliance.
Rather than making America great again, Trump could further hasten its decline by mistaking the destruction of what is left of the liberal international order with its reshaping according to US interests.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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