China
The rights and wrongs of US overflights in the South China Sea
Author: Sourabh Gupta, Samuels International
Over the past six years, unilateral and escalatory actions by claimants to territories in the South China Sea have exacerbated tensions in the region.
China has not been the precipitator of the tensions in these waters — whether it be in initiating resource exploration activities in disputed areas, introducing military vessels to enforce jurisdictional claims, or conducting land reclamation work in the adjoining waters. In each instance, other claimants were the first to roil the waters.
But China’s response to actions by other claimants has been heavy-handed, disproportionate to the provocation at hand and, at times, designed to destabilise an already-delicate situation. That said, none of the actions by claimants, China included, has violated international law — even if some of the actions have operated in grey areas where definitive rules are lacking (such as in respect of the status of maritime historic rights). The same cannot be said about recently-publicised actions by the US Navy in these contested waters.
On 20 May, a US Navy P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft directly flew over a Chinese administered artificial island constructed atop a Spratly’s feature (the Fiery Cross Reef) in the South China Sea. The American crew insisting that it was flying through international airspace. The overflight was provocative, dangerous and inconsistent with international law. Worse, the most senior US diplomat for the East and Southeast Asia region appears not to grasp this, insisting that the flight was ‘entirely appropriate’.
International law on artificial islands, installations and structures is very clear. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea reads: ‘In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state shall have the exclusive right to construct artificial islands, installations and structures; the coastal state shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such islands; [it] may, where necessary, establish reasonable safety zones around such islands … [so long as these zones do] not exceed 500 metres around them, measured from each point of their outer edge; [all vessels] must respect these safety zones’.
China is legally entitled to reclaim and construct artificial islands and installations in the sea areas adjacent to the land features that it administers within the Spratlys chain. There is no rule in international law that bars a coastal state from undertaking this kind of reclamation at sea.
And, so long as the feature resides within the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (or median line thereof) of an ‘island’ administered by China in the Spratlys, Beijing is entitled to reclaim and build atop that land feature — even if it is submerged at high-tide. Three of Beijing’s seven administered features in the Spratlys protrude above sea level at high-tide and could comport to the technical definition of an ‘island’. If Itu Aba/Taiping Island — an ‘island’ that is administered by Taiwan — is considered to be Chinese territory as per the ‘One China’ policy, then every China-administered feature in the Spratlys chain is encompassed within this exclusive economic zone area up to the median line.
China also has the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the waters and airspace above the artificial island, out to perimeter of 500 metres from its outer edges. Establishing such a safety zone has nothing to do with unilateral enforcement of a military exclusion zone or an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) as some have claimed.
It follows that the US Navy by directly flying over the artificial island has violated Beijing’s rights. Admittedly, the US is not a party to the Law of the Sea Treaty and hence is not bound by its strictures. By the same token, the US’ customary navigation and overflight freedoms do not override the prescriptive treaty-based rights that accrue to Beijing in the airspace and adjoining waters of its artificial islands, installations and structures.
The flights are not just legally untenable and dangerously escalatory; they also have implications beyond the immediate legal infringement. Specifically, they are also a standing invitation to the Chinese to send surveillance flights through the airspace directly above the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In November 2013, Beijing declared an ADIZ in the East China Sea, which controversially included the airspace over these disputed islands. China has until now refrained from conducting non-commercial flights through this airspace. But it would be within its rights as a claimant to take such provocative and unwise action. It is extremely unwise for Washington to lay the groundwork for such behaviour through its own errant actions in the South China Sea. To rein in its Spratlys overflights would be the sensible course.
The driver of America’s actions in the Spratlys is a growing and pervasive mind-set within the Beltway that insists that the US must ‘do something … anything’ to demonstrate active resolve in the face of regional anxiety over China’s use of military and paramilitary force to allegedly change the status quo.
If that is indeed a sensible strategic objective, US (and other claimants’) naval vessels and aircraft could operationally assert their navigational and overflight freedoms beyond the 500-metre safety zone of China’s artificial islands that are built atop low-tide elevations. Such features are not entitled to a territorial sea. Common sense would dictate that as a precaution the overflights should be kept some distance away from the 500-metre zone.
But no party in the South China Sea should engage in non-commercial passage through the airspace above an artificial island, installation or structures that they do not administer or are obliged to protect. For the United States to do so would be to violate international law; for other claimants to do so would be to engage in dangerously provocative actions.
High seas navigational and overflight freedoms in the waters adjoining the disputed land features in the South China Sea have not been violated, despite a rhetorical tendency to inflate the threat to these freedoms. The exercise of these freedoms, especially by non-claimants, should not interfere with the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of those who are claimant parties in these waters.
Sourabh Gupta is a Senior Research Associate at Samuels International Associates, Inc., Washington, D.C.
See the rest here:
The rights and wrongs of US overflights in the South China Sea
Business
Business Update: Southern Sun Reports Earnings Growth; China Stimulates Property Market – News24
Southern Sun reports increased earnings, attributed to growth in the hospitality sector, while China’s property market receives a boost, reflecting economic recovery and renewed investor confidence.
Southern Sun Earnings Surge
Southern Sun has reported a significant increase in its earnings, showcasing solid financial performance amid evolving market conditions. This growth highlights the company’s resilience and adaptability to changing consumer demands, positioning it well for future opportunities in the hospitality industry.
China’s Property Market Recovery
In a bid to rejuvenate its economy, China has introduced measures to boost its property market. These initiatives aim to stabilize real estate prices and encourage investment, which is crucial for maintaining economic momentum. The government’s commitment to supporting the sector reflects its understanding of the industry’s importance in overall economic health.
Broader Economic Implications
The rise in Southern Sun’s earnings and China’s proactive approach to revitalizing its property market indicate broader economic trends. Investors and stakeholders are keenly observing these developments, as they may signal recovery and growth opportunities in both the hospitality and real estate sectors. The collaboration between local businesses and governmental actions will be pivotal in shaping future economic landscapes.
Source : Business brief | Southern Sun sees earnings rise; China boosts its property market – News24
China
Vietnam’s Approach to China: A Balance of Cooperation and Struggle
Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy seeks a balance of cooperation and struggle with China, focusing on strengthening ties while resisting encroachments in the South China Sea through military enhancements and regional partnerships.
Vietnam’s Diplomatic Strategy
Vietnam’s diplomatic approach seeks to maintain a delicate balance between cooperation and struggle with China. While concerned about China’s growing influence, particularly in the South China Sea, Hanoi focuses on strengthening its economic and political ties. This effort involves military enhancements, fostering relationships with regional powers, and engaging in frequent political dialogues. By skillfully navigating relations with major powers, Vietnam aims to protect its sovereignty and foster stability amidst evolving geopolitical dynamics.
Recent Developments and Implications
Hanoi’s diplomatic maneuvering has drawn attention, particularly regarding key visits like Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary To Lam’s August 2024 trip to China. Although there are apprehensions about a potential shift in Vietnam’s alignment due to To Lam’s background in public security and his anti-corruption initiatives, it is premature to predict any significant changes in policy. Vietnam’s leaders must continuously seek a balance between peaceful coexistence with China and safeguarding national sovereignty.
Economic Interdependence and Military Modernization
Vietnam’s strategy involves fostering economic interdependence with China while simultaneously resisting encroachments. This paradigm of “cooperation and struggle” enables Hanoi to cultivate beneficial ties in economic, political, and security domains. By leveraging its geographical advantage and connections, Vietnam enhances its economic ties while countering threats through military modernization and cooperation with regional partners. This nuanced approach allows Vietnam to welcome trade, particularly amidst shifting dynamics from the US-China trade war, ensuring continued foreign direct investment and growth in key sectors.
Source : Cooperation and struggle define Vietnam’s approach to China
China
2025 Schedule of Public Holidays in China
China’s 2025 public holiday schedule increases holidays by two days, with an 8-day Spring Festival and a 5-day Labor Day. Adjustments address public frustration, though long work periods persist. Notably, weekends are often designated as workdays to balance extended breaks.
China has released its 2025 Public Holiday schedule. Compared to 2024, the number of public holidays for all citizens has increased by two days, specifically for Lunar New Year’s Eve and May 2nd.
The announcement also clarifies the adjusted holiday arrangements, stating that the continuous work period before and after statutory holidays generally should not exceed six days, except for certain special circumstances.
According to the notice, in 2025, the Spring Festival will have an 8-day holiday, the Labor Day holiday will last 5 days, and the National Day and Mid-Autumn Festival will jointly have 8 days off.
China has long been considered one of the least generous countries in terms of public holidays. Additionally, people have expressed frustration over the complicated adjustments to holiday and working days that are meant to create longer breaks. The newly introduced changes are expected to address these concerns to some extent.
Beyond the newly introduced changes, China’s 2025 public holiday schedule still features two major week-long holidays: Spring Festival (also known as Chinese New Year) and the National Day holiday (often called ‘Golden Week’).
In 2025, the Spring Festival falls between January 28 and February 4, and the National Day holiday, together with the Mid-Autumn Festival, fall between October 1 and 8.
Foreign human resource managers should note that Saturdays and Sundays are often marked as additional official workdays in China to compensate for long holiday breaks. For example, January 26 (Sunday) and February 8 (Saturday) are designated as workdays to partially offset the eight days off for the Spring Festival.
This article was first published by China Briefing , which is produced by Dezan Shira & Associates. The firm assists foreign investors throughout Asia from offices across the world, including in in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and India . Readers may write to info@dezshira.com for more support. |
Read the rest of the original article.