Trade
Strengthening the ASEAN-centric multilateral security architecture
Author: Sarah Teo, RSIS
For a good part of the post-Cold War period, ASEAN enjoyed relative success as the central multilateral organisation in its region. Its expansion through the late 1990s, as well as its inclusive approach towards non-ASEAN powers, helped it become the main convener of multilateral dialogue and cooperative platforms in the wider Asia Pacific.
But over the last decade, ASEAN’s role in the multilateral architecture has faced challenges from what some analysts call the rise of ‘multilateralism 2.0’ — multilateralism driven by major powers rather than ASEAN — and the proliferation of non-ASEAN-centric minilateral arrangements.
Such developments resulted in concerns about the robustness of the ASEAN-centric multilateral architecture amid a period of structural and strategic transitions. These concerns have been exacerbated by the current US administration’s apparent disdain for multilateralism, including those centred on ASEAN.
The danger is that in light of criticisms of ASEAN’s ineffectiveness, the Association’s so-called centrality in regional multilateralism could rapidly diminish if non-ASEAN powers succeed in creating credible alternatives to ASEAN-centric forums. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) involving Australia, India, Japan and the United States, as well as the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) mechanism comprising Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam are examples that evoke such concerns.
Yet, the ASEAN-centric multilateral security architecture may be more robust than commonly acknowledged. ASEAN currently has a reasonably full suite of mechanisms to address a range of issues, including the leaders-level ASEAN Summit and East Asia Summit, the foreign ministers-led ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and ASEAN Regional Forum, as well as the defence ministers-led ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and the ADMM-Plus.
For security and strategic issues, avenues already exist for dialogue and practical cooperation — both at the ASEAN and the wider Asia Pacific levels. China may have its Xiangshan Forum and Boao Forum and the United States is typically seen to dominate the Shangri-La Dialogue but ASEAN remains the best equipped for bringing together all the main regional actors across different sectors.
The key is to strengthen this ASEAN-centric multilateral security architecture and ensure that it remains the best option for both ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries when it comes to wider-level regional multilateralism. In this sense, even if the major powers form like-minded coalitions to address specific issues, they would still turn to ASEAN-centric platforms because they offer the highest returns for broader multilateral consultations and collaboration.
One way to strengthen the ASEAN-centric multilateral security architecture would be to enhance ASEAN’s capacity as an independent actor.
Since its establishment, the ASEAN narrative has been one of strength in weakness. Because its member states possess neither sufficient economic nor military resources to be threatening, ASEAN is able to leverage this ‘weakness’ to serve as the convenor of regional multilateralism that includes major powers such as China, Japan and the United States. The competition between China and Japan over leadership of the East Asia Summit in the mid-2000s, for instance, resulted in ASEAN assuming the reins of the new multilateral platform by default. A similar scenario may well repeat itself to ASEAN’s benefit.
But going forwards it is likely that ASEAN will find such opportunities rare as major power rivalry intensifies and the major powers create networks aimed specifically at their own interests. For example, some observers have highlighted the potential for China to extend its influence southwards through the LMC mechanism — this may pose the risk of deepening divisions within ASEAN. Likewise, the Quad, even with the debates surrounding its sustainability, reflects the priority concerns of its four members that may not necessarily dovetail with ASEAN’s.
Whether ASEAN retains its position as the hub of regional multilateralism largely depends on the extent it can come across as a credible independent actor. Declarations that ASEAN does not wish to choose between China and the United States must be backed up with the capacity that actually allows ASEAN the option of not choosing.
A starting point towards acquiring this capacity is to strengthen the cohesion among ASEAN member states. The aim should be to prevent another instance of ASEAN failing to agree on…
Trade
Self-Reliance and Openness: Core Principles of China’s Third Plenary Session
The Third Plenum communique from the CCP indicates a prioritization of stability and compromise in response to China’s economic challenges. It highlights the concept of Chinese-style modernization and establishes political guidelines for balancing regulation and market forces.
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Trade
Trade Prevails Over Political Persuasions in China-Germany Relations
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Economic Pragmatism
As the second and third largest global economies, China and Germany’s economic interdependence is crucial. Germany emerged as China’s primary trading partner in 2023, with trade values reaching €254.4 billion (US$280 billion). In response to global scrutiny, Germany has taken a balanced approach, emphasizing economic stability over political discord. This was evident during Scholz’s prior visit in November 2022, where his diplomatic tone contrasted with broader EU sentiments.
Facing Challenges Together
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Source : Trade trumps political persuasions in China–Germany relations
Trade
Fixing fragmentation in the settlement of international trade disputes
Fragmentation in global trade due to the lack of development in multilateral trade rules at the WTO has led to an increase in FTAs. The Appellate Body impasse has further exacerbated fragmentation, requiring a multilateral approach for reform.
Fragmentation in Global Trade
Fragmentation in global trade is not new. With the slow development of multilateral trade rules at the World Trade Organization (WTO), governments have turned to free trade agreements (FTAs). As of 2023, almost 600 bilateral and regional trade agreements have been notified to the WTO, leading to growing fragmentation in trade rules, business activities, and international relations. But until recently, trade dispute settlements have predominantly remained within the WTO.
Challenges with WTO Dispute Settlement
The demise of the Appellate Body increased fragmentation in both the interpretation and enforcement of trade law. A small number of WTO Members created the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) as a temporary solution, but in its current form, it cannot properly address fragmentation. Since its creation in 2020, the MPIA has only attracted 26 parties, and its rulings have not been consistent with previous decisions made by the Appellate Body, rendering WTO case law increasingly fragmented.
The Path Forward for Global Trade
Maintaining the integrity and predictability of the global trading system while reducing fragmentation requires restoring the WTO’s authority. At the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference in 2022, governments agreed to re-establish a functional dispute settlement system by 2024. Reaching a consensus will be difficult, and negotiations will take time. A critical mass-based, open plurilateral approach provides a viable alternative way to reform the appellate mechanism, as WTO Members are committed to reforming the dispute settlement system.
Source : Fixing fragmentation in the settlement of international trade disputes
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